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Metaphysical Dogmatism, Humean Scepticism, Kantian Criticism 
 
ROBERT STERN 
University of Sheffield 
 
In this paper, I want to argue that scepticism for Kant must be seen in ancient and not 
just modern terms, and that if we take this into account, we will need to take a 
GLIIHUHQWYLHZRI.DQW¶VUHVSRQVHWR+XPHWKDQWKHRQHWKDWLVVWDQGDUGO\SUHVHQWHGLQ
the literature. This standard view has been put forward recently by Paul Guyer,1 and it 
is therefore his view that I want to look at in some detail, and to try to correct. 
 
 
I 
 
,Q KLV SDSHU µ.DQW RQ &RPPRQ 6HQVH DQG 6FHSWLFLVP¶ *X\HU DUJXHV DJDLQVW WKRVH
(such as Karl Ameriks) who have claimed that the refutation of scepticism was not a 
central objective for Kant.2 Such claims have been made in reaction to a myopic focus 
RQ VFHSWLFDO LVVXHV DVEHLQJ.DQW¶V VROH FRQFHUQ LQ DZD\ WKDW HQGVXSPDNLQJ WKH
Refutation of Idealism the central achievement of the first Critique (where Ameriks 
has commentators such as Strawson in mind). In response, Guyer allows (and I would 
agree) that the Refutation of Idealism is not what the Critique is mostly about, and so 
JUDQWV WKDW LWZRXOGEHZURQJ WR WDNH&DUWHVLDQVFHSWLFLVPWREH.DQW¶VPDLQIRFXV
where this concerns our knowledge of the existence and character of the external 
ZRUOG *X\HU FRPPHQWV WKDW µ.DQW GRHV QRW DGGUHVV VFHSWLFDO GRXEWV DERXW WKH
existence of external objects at the outset of the first Critique, nor does he organize 
WKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHERRNDVDZKROHDURXQGWKLVLVVXH¶+HDOORZVWKDWµ>W@KLVLVQRW to 
say that the refutation of Cartesian scepticism was unimportant to Kant; it obviously 
was, as, apparently dissatisfied with the published Refutation, he returned to the topic 
DQG GUDIWHG QXPHURXV IXUWKHU YHUVLRQV RI WKH DUJXPHQW LQ WKH IROORZLQJ \HDUV¶. 
+RZHYHU *X\HU DOVR QRWHV WKDW µ>.DQW¶V@ IDPRXV VWDWHPHQW WKDW VFHSWLFLVP DERXW
H[WHUQDOREMHFWVLV³DVFDQGDOWRSKLORVRSK\DQGXQLYHUVDOKXPDQUHDVRQ´DOWKRXJKLW
occurs in the Preface to the second edition, in fact occurs only on a footnote 
amplifying the Refutation of Idealism that has been inserted into the second 
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3RVWXODWH¶*X\HUFRQFOXGHVWKHUHIRUHWKDWµWKLVIRUPRIVFHSWLFLVP«ZDVQRWFHQWUDO
to the organization of the Critique of Pure Reason¶3 
Nonetheless, Guyer argues, while commentators like Ameriks may be right to 
downplay the significance of the Refutation of Idealism and thus Cartesian scepticism 
WR .DQW¶V SURMHFW WKLV LV QRW WR VKRZ WKDW VFHSWLFLVP in toto was only of tangential 
interest to Kant: for, Guyer suggests, there are two other forms of scepticism that 
Kant was concerned with, both of which are central to the philosophical project of the 
Critique7KHILUVWRIWKHVHIRUPVRIVFHSWLFLVP*X\HUODEHOVµ3\UUKRQLVP¶DQGPD\
be seen to arise from the natural dialectic of human reason, where we are left in a state 
of conflicting opinions on metaphysical matters. The second form of scepticism is one 
WKDW *X\HU DVVRFLDWHV ZLWK +XPH ZKHUH +XPH¶V HPSLULFLVW WUHDWPHQW RI ZKDW ZH
claim to know is said to undercut the necessity and universality of the principles 
concerned: for example, if, as Kant puts it, Hume is right to hold that our concept of 
FDXVDOLW\ µLV UHDOO\ QRWKLQJ EXW D EDVWDUG RI WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ«LPSUHJQDWHG E\
H[SHULHQFH¶KRZFDQµUHDVRQ«JLYHKLPDQDFFRXQWRIE\ZKDWULJKWVKH thinks: that 
something could be so constituted that, if it is posited, something else necessarily 
PXVWWKHUHE\EHSRVLWHGDVZHOOIRUWKDWLVZKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIFDXVHVD\V¶4 
Having distinguished these forms of scepticism, Guyer argues that (unlike 
Cartesian scepticism) each may be seen to be central to the Critique, where each is 
assigned its allotted refutation within different parts of that work. Guyer writes: 
 
As we have seen, Kant is chiefly worried about two forms of scepticism, 
Humean doubt about the universal and necessary validity of such fundamental 
concepts as causality raised by Hume, and the Pyrrhonian scepticism about 
reason itself that is the inevitable response to the natural dialectic of 
metaphysic dogmata. The two parts of the Critique of Pure Reason respond to 
these two forms of scepticism in turn.5 
 
Given the way in which these forms of scepticism shape the Critique, Guyer argues, it 
is wrong-KHDGHG WRVXJJHVW WKDW.DQW¶VFRQFHUQZLWKVFHSWLFLVPZDVQHJOLJLEOH WKLV
can only seem right if we adopt a narrow conception of scepticism that is supposed to 
be merely Cartesian; but once we allow Pyrrhonian and Humean scepticism into the 
picture,6 the real significance of scepticism to Kant can be properly appreciated, and 
its fundamental role can be recognized for what it was. Thus, Guyer summarises his 
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YLHZE\VD\LQJWKDWµ)DUIURPEHLQJLQGLIIHUHQWWRVFHSWLFLVPWKHQ.DQWRUJDQL]HVWKH
H[SRVLWLRQRIKLVHQWLUHSKLORVRSK\DVDUHVSRQVHWRVFHSWLFLVPDVKHXQGHUVWDQGLW¶7 
 
 
II 
 
Now, there is PXFKWKDW ,ZRXOGDJUHHZLWK LQ*X\HU¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRI WKHVH LVVXHV
As I have said, I would agree with him that we should take care not to focus 
exclusively on the Refutation of Idealism and Cartesian scepticism,8 and I would 
agree that this scepticism can be distinguished from other, more central, sceptical 
concerns in the Critique. However, where I would disagree with Guyer, is the way in 
which he distinguishes so sharply between the two more fundamental forms of 
scepticism ± Humean and Pyrrhonian  ± and thus between the two parts of the 
Critique that these forms of scepticism are said to shape ± the Transcendental 
Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic respectively. 
 Guyer draws these sharp distinctions, I think, because he fails to see that for 
Kant, there is a Pyrrhonist argument for the Humean treatment of concepts like 
causality, and not just an empiricist one, and that is fact the latter argument is merely 
an aspect of the former. That is, Kant took Hume to be not just an empiricist sceptic, 
but an empiricist sceptic motivated in his empiricism by the Pyrrhonist hope that as a 
result the ceaseless debates in metaphysics can be brought to an end, by showing them 
to be unresolvable by us, in a way that will bring us tranquillity. Likewise, as I see it, 
.DQW¶VDUJXPHQW DJDLQVW+XPH LVQRW MXVW WKDWKLVHPSLULFLVW WUHDWPHQWRIDFRQFHSW
like cause is misguided, but that his claim to have attained tranquillity thereby is 
mistaken, so that Kant has an anti-Pyrrhonist point to make against him, not just an 
anti-empiricist one. As a result, I will argue, these forms of scepticism should not be 
set apart in the clean way that Guyer does, in a way that also leads him to distinguish 
sharply (but in my view wrongly) between the anti-sceptical roles of the second and 
third parts of the Critique. 
 Now, if we are to read Hume as being not just an empiricist sceptic but also a 
3\UUKRQLVWVFHSWLF LQ.DQW¶VH\HVZKDWVKRXOGZHEH ORRNLQJIRU")RURXUSXUSRVHV
here, this difference may be roughly characterised as follows. The empiricist sceptic is 
a type of modern sceptic, who urges that we should doubt certain things we claim to 
know (such as the causal principle that every event must have a cause), because he 
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believes he can show that no adequate account of our knowledge of such things can 
be offered, given the cognitive methods available to us, which are insufficient to 
support such universal and necessary claims. The Pyrrhonist sceptic, by contrast, is a 
type of ancient sceptic, who holds that for some or all of the issues we set out to 
investigate, equally strong arguments can be found to support different views of the 
subject in question, so that on such issues we should suspend judgement for now or 
perhaps avoid persisting in our inquiries altogether, in order to avoid endless and 
vexatious disputes, and where this suspension of judgement will enable us to attain 
ataraxia or tranquillity, as the better form of life. The natural target of the ancient 
sceptic, therefore, is the dogmatist, who thinks he has arrived at the truth on some 
matter and so has no need to suspend judgement, as attaining the truth will bring 
consensus and hence tranquillity; but for the sceptic, it is naïve to think that such a 
point has been or even can be reached, and the only stability the dogmatist achieves is 
a fragile one, of failing to properly recognize the counterarguments to his position. To 
succeed against the dogmatist, therefore, the sceptic must persuade him that he is 
premature in thinking that a position on some issue has been decisively established, as 
whatever position the dogmatist has (or perhaps can ever) come up with faces an 
equally strong opposing position on that issue, between which no decisive judgement 
can be made; the dogmatist is therefore best advised to become a sceptic, and suspend 
judgement on this question, and maybe even give up inquiring further into it 
altogether, if he hopes to attain tranquillity. In modern debates, by contrast, the 
sceptic is not seen as advocating a picture of the good life, and the success of the 
scepticism is not judged on whether it shows that the goal of tranquillity can only be 
achieved by suspending judgement rather than in having reached an indisputable 
view. Rather, the issues raised by modern scepticism concern how far we can show 
that we have sufficient grounds for our belief in certain claims about the world, given 
our cognitive access to it. 
 Now, as we have discussed, Guyer rightly recognizes that Kant saw that 
scepticism could take an ancient form within the contemporary arena, thanks to the 
problematic status of metaphysics.9 For, Kant sees the difficulties of metaphysics in 
terms of the classical dispute between dogmatism on the one hand, and scepticism on 
the other, where what is at issue is which of these approaches can bring us peace with 
respect to metaphysical questions. Thus, dogmatists think that they can settle various 
metaphysical disputes by arguing for a position that is true and will therefore 
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command consensus; but the sceptic argues that contrary views are also available, so 
that faced with isostheneia RUµHTXDOIRUFHRQERWKVLGHV¶WKHRQO\UDWLRQDOFRXUVHLVWR
suspend judgement ± and if this problem persists, perhaps also abandon further 
inquiry into these matters altogether.10 Now, Kant agrees with the sceptic that under 
WKH UXOH RI WKH GRJPDWLVWV WKH µHPSLUH¶ RI PHWDSK\VLFV µJUDGXDOO\ WKURXJK LQWHUQDO
ZDUV JDYH ZD\ WR FRPSOHWH DQDUFK\¶11 VR WKDW LW LV QRZ D µEDWWOH-ILHOG RI«HQGOHVV
FRQWURYHUVLHV¶12 EXWKHQRQHWKHOHVVWKLQNVWKDWWKHZD\WREUHDNWKHGRJPDWLVWV¶ hold 
over metaphysics is not to side with the sceptic, as the sceptic cannot prevent the 
dogmatist regaining his confidence, and thus the battles breaking out again. Thus, 
Kant argues, it is rather only by becoming a critical philosopher that the tranquillity 
the sceptic is looking for can be attained, so that in the end the latter must give way to 
the former. 
 As we have seen, however, Guyer places this concern with ancient scepticism 
ZLWKLQWKH'LDOHFWLFDQGLVRODWHVLWIURP.DQW¶VFRQFHUQZLWK+XPHZKom he takes 
to raise merely the more modern form of sceptical worry for Kant, namely: how do 
we show that our belief in the universality and necessity of causality is legitimate? 
And here, as Guyer says, he is expressing what I think is the standard view, where 
Kant is read as addressing this worry in the Second Analogy, and the Transcendental 
Analytic more generally. 
However, this is to neglect the way in which Kant also took Hume to be 
centrally concerned with the problematic status of metaphysics, to which Pyrrhonist 
scepticism might then be taken to provide some sort of answer.13 Just as Kant begins 
the first Critique by reflecting gloomily on the way in which metaphysics has become 
DµEDWWOHILHOG¶VR+XPHEHJLQVKLVTreatise by commenting on the unsatisfactory state 
of the subject, emphasising the seemingly endless arguments to be found on all sides: 
 
There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of 
learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial questions escapes not 
our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any 
certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and 
these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was 
FHUWDLQ $PLGVW DOO WKLV EXVWOH ¶Wis not reason, which carries the prize, but 
eloquence, and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most 
extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable 
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colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike 
and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. 
 From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against 
metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess 
themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of the 
literature.14 
   
1RZWR.DQWLWDSSHDUHGWKDW+XPH¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVVLWXDWLRQZDVDVFHSWLFDORQH
in the classical sense: namely, that the endless disputes show that we must think again 
about what metaphysical inquiry can hope to achieve, and refuse to commit ourselves 
on such matters, turning instead to more modest investigations where the possibility 
of consensus is more real.15  
 Indeed, it seems to me, Kant fundamentally thought that this Pyrrhonism is 
what underSLQQHG +XPH¶V HPSLULFLVW VFHSWLFLVP UHJDUGLQJ RXU QRWLRQ RI FDXVH IRU
WKLVDFFRXQWRIFDXVHDVµDEDVWDUGRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQIDWKHUHGE\H[SHULHQFH¶KDVWKH
advantage, Hume might claim, of making us see that metaphysical inquiries of the 
dogmatic kind are very unlikely to be successful, and indeed of explaining why they 
have not succeeded up to now. So, for example, in the Preface to the Prolegomena, 
ZKHUH.DQWDWWDFNV+XPH¶VµFRPPRQVHQVH¶FULWLFVVXFKDV5HLG2VZDOG%HDWWLHDQG
Priestly for really misVLQJWKHSRLQWRI+XPH¶VFRQFHUQV.DQWPDLQO\IRFXVHVRQWKH
fact that they themselves can offer no solution to the problem of metaphysics, because 
on their account the concept of cause has no limit to its employment, and so cannot 
prevent metaphysical speculation taking off:  
 
The question was not, whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with 
UHVSHFW WR DOO FRJQLWLRQ RI QDWXUH LQGLVSHQVDEOH >DV +XPH¶V FRPPRQ VHQVH
critics insisted], for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather whether it 
is thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth 
independent of all experience, and therefore also a much more widely 
extended use which is not limited merely to objects of experience: regarding 
this Hume awaited enlightenment. The discussion was only about the origin of 
this concept, not about its indispensability in use; if the former were only 
discovered, the condition of its use and the sphere in which it can be valid 
would already be given.16 
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7KH QDWXUH RI +XPH¶V SURMHFW IRU .Dnt, therefore, is not merely the fundamentally 
modern one, of casting doubt on our entitlement to the causal notions we use, 
concerning the necessity and universality of causal relations, but equally the ancient 
one, of adopting a conception of causality that can be justified by the way it puts an 
HQGWRHQGOHVVPHWDSK\VLFDOGLVSXWHVLQDZD\WKDW+XPH¶V3\UUKRQLVPLVGHVLJQHGWR
bring out. 
The question for Kant, however, is whether Hume can do enough to persuade 
the dogmatist to join him, and give up his pursuit of metaphysical truth? Kant argues 
that Hume cannot succeed, to the extent that he is not a properly critical philosopher. 
The problem Hume faces, according to Kant, is that (as Kant see it) Hume is obliged 
to be too radical in his attempt to bring µSHDFH¶ WR PHWDSK\VLFV LQ D ZD\ WKDW
undermines his efforts to persuade the dogmatist that he would be best to withdraw 
from the fray, as the fight cannot be won. This is because, Kant thinks, the principles 
on which the dogmatic metaphysician bases his claims are ones that are hard to 
dispute, so that in rejecting his appeal to these principles by abandoning them 
altogether, Hume is forced into an implausible position when he comes to question 
them. According to Kant, the difficulty for Hume is that we eQG XS RQ WKH µEDWWOH-
ILHOG¶RIPHWDSK\VLFVE\EHJLQQLQJµZLWKSULQFLSOHVZKLFK>UHDVRQ@KDVQRRSWLRQVDYH
to employ in the course of experience, and which this experience at the same time 
DEXQGDQWO\MXVWLILHVLWLQXVLQJ¶+RZHYHU 
 
[r]ising with their aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature) to 
ever higher, ever more remote, conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this 
way ± the questions never ceasing ± its work must always remain incomplete; 
and it therefore finds itself compelled to resort to principles which overstep all 
possible empirical employment, and which yet seem so unobjectionable that 
even ordinary consciousness readily accepts them. But by this procedure 
human reason precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions; and while it 
may indeed conjecture that these must be in some way due to concealed errors, 
it is not in a position to be able to detect them. For since the principles of 
which it is making use transcend the limits of experience, they are no longer 
subject to any empirical test.17 
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The principle of causality (that every event has a cause, which brings it about 
necessarily) is a case in point here: Kant believes that this is a principle which we 
KDYH µQR RSWLRQV VDYH WR HPSOR\ LQ WKH FRXUVH RI H[SHULHQFH¶ DQG which seems 
µXQREMHFWLRQDEOH¶ WR µRUGLQDU\ FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ ZKLFK FDQQRW FRQFHLYH RI DQ HYHQW
happening without a cause, and that event following from the cause merely by 
accident, in a way that is not governed by any law. However, using this principle, the 
SKLORVRSKHUFDQILQGKLPVHOIGUDZQLQWRWKHµEDWWOH-ILHOG¶RIPHWDSK\VLFVFRQFHUQLQJ
such issues as the existence of God, for example,18 in a way that then gives rise to 
familiar controversies. The sceptical response is to say that we should withhold assent 
on such metaphysical matters, and consider our inquiry futile; but, the dogmatist can 
ask, if we are here using principles (like the principle of causality) that are indeed 
µXQREMHFWLRQDEOH¶ WR µRUGLQDU\ FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ ZK\ VKRXOG ZH DFFHSW WKDW QR
consensus is possible, and that no single view on such matters can be attained? 
 1RZDV.DQWVHHVLW+XPH¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVFKDOOHQJHWRWKHVFHSWLFLVDYHU\
UDGLFDORQHQDPHO\ WRTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUµRUGLQDU\FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶LV right to view a 
principle like FDXVDOLW\ DV µXQREMHFWLRQDEOH¶ LQ WKLVZD\DV DZD\RISUHYHQWLQJ WKH
dogmatic metaphysician from licensing their speculations by appeal to the apparently 
unproblematic nature of the principles it is using ± IRU +XPH HYHQ RXU µRUGLQDU\
FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ KDs gone astray on this matter.19 +RZHYHU .DQW WKLQNV +XPH¶V
DWWHPSWWREULQJµSHDFH¶WRPHWDSK\VLFVLQWKLVZD\FDQQRWVXFFHHGEHFDXVHLWLVWRR
UDGLFDOLQLWVTXHVWLRQLQJRIµRUGLQDU\FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶.DQWWKLQNVKHFDQVKRZLQWKH
Second Analogy and elsewhere) that the principle of causality is not to be undermined 
LQWKLVZD\DQGWKHVDPHLVWUXHRIRWKHUSULQFLSOHVRIµRUGLQDU\FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶VXFK
DVWKHSULQFLSOHRISHUPDQHQFHµLQDOOFKDQJHRIDSSHDUDQFHVVXEVWDQFHLVSHUPDQHQW
its quantum in natuUHLVQHLWKHULQFUHDVHGQRUGLPLQLVKHG¶20 which the metaphysician 
makes use of. 
 Kant therefore views Hume as a sceptic in a classical as well as a modern 
VHQVH ZKR ULJKWO\ ZDQWHG WR SUHYHQW XV EHFRPLQJ PLUHG LQ WKH µEDWWOH-ILHOG¶ RI
metaphysics, where only the dogmatist could naively think our disputes might be 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion, by getting us to accept that further inquiry here is 
misguided. However, Kant believes, as long as the dogmatist feels that their inquiry is 
based on sound priQFLSOHVRIµRUGLQDU\FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶WKH\ZLOOEHXQSHUVXDGHGEXW
Hume thinks he can defend his sceptical stance by questioning those principles 
themselves, in a way that Kant thinks is nonetheless misguided, because this sort of 
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radicalism can be made to VHHPXQFRPSHOOLQJ7KXV.DQWWKLQNVLQYLHZRI+XPH¶V
flawed empiricist challenge to the principle of causality and his attempt to reject it 
DOWRJHWKHU +XPH¶V DWWHPSW WR EULQJ µSHDFH¶ WR PHWDSK\VLFV LV XQGHUPLQHG DQG WKH
dogmatist can feel he is back in business:  
 
Thus the fate that waits upon all scepticism likewise befalls Hume, namely, 
that his own sceptical teaching comes to be doubted, as being based only on 
facts [facta] which are contingent, not on principles which can constrain to a 
necessary UHQXQFLDWLRQRIDOOULJKW WRGRJPDWLFDVVHUWLRQV«$FFRUGLQJO\ WKDW
peculiarly characteristic ardour with which reason insists upon giving full rein 
to itself, has not in the least been disturbed but only temporarily impeded. It 
does not feel that it has been shut out from the field in which it is wont to 
disport itself; and so, in spite of its being thwarted in this and that direction, it 
cannot be made entirely to desist from these ventures. On the contrary, the 
attacks lead only to counter-preparations, and make us the more obstinate in 
insisting upon our own views.21 
 
,QVWHDG RI EULQJLQJ WKH FRPEDWDQWV WR WKHLU VHQVHV .DQW KROGV +XPH¶V DSSURDFK
leaves them free to carry on much as they did before. 
 .DQWDUJXHVWKHUHIRUHWKDWE\FRQVLGHULQJ+XPH¶VVFHSWical strategy, and the 
way that in fact it allows metaphysical hostilities to continue, we can see that while 
µWKHVFHSWLFDOPHWKRGRIHVFDSLQJWKHWURXEOHVRPHDIIDLUVRIUHDVRQDSSHDUVWREHDVLW
were, a short cut by which we can arrive at a permanent pHDFHLQSKLORVRSK\¶22 this is 
nonetheless a short cut that cannot really be made to work, or get us where we want to 
JR5DWKHU.DQWFODLPVZHQHHGWRWDNHWKHµORQJURDG¶RIWKHFULWLFDOSKLORVRSK\LI
we really want to achieve the tranquillity that the sceptic desires.23 How is this so? 
 7KH NH\ WR .DQW¶V VWUDWHJ\ LV WR RIIHU D ZD\ RI DOORZLQJ µRUGLQDU\
FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ WR KDQJ RQ WR SULQFLSOHV VXFK DV WKH SULQFLSOH RI FDXVDOLW\ DQG WKH
principle of permanence (contra Hume), but to argue that these principles are only 
valid for objects as they appear to us within experience, and so cannot be employed 
within any metaphysical speculations, which concern objects that lie outside our 
experience (such as God); the dogmatist is therefore not entitled to appeal to these 
principles as a way of arguing for the possibility of progress in their metaphysical 
speculations. Where the critical philosopher differs from the sceptic, then, is that 
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while both hold that the dogmatist has little hope in succeeding in their inquiries, the 
critical philosopher shows dogmatists exactly where they have gone wrong, and offers 
them a principled argument that shows not just why their inquiries have failed up to 
QRZEXWZK\WKH\ZLOODOZD\VIDLOLQDZD\WKDWQRQHWKHOHVVUHVSHFWVRXUµHYHU\GD\¶
commitment to principles like the principle of causality within the bounds of 
experience. As Kant puts it, therefore, where the sceptic merely censors human reason 
and its attempt to conduct metaphysical inquiries, the critical philosopher sets it 
within well-defined limits, in a way that (Kant thinks) will finally bring us the kind of 
lasting peace the sceptic was after but could not attain: 
 
All sceptical polemic should properly be directed only against the dogmatist 
who, without any misgivings as to his fundamental objective principles, that 
is, without criticism, proceeds complacently upon his adopted path; it should 
be designed simply to put him out of countenance and thus to bring him to 
self-knowledge. In itself, however, this polemic is of no avail whatsoever in 
enabling us to decide what it is that we can and what it is that we cannot know. 
All unsuccessful dogmatic attempts of reason are facts [facta], and it is always 
of advantage to submit them to the censorship of the sceptic. But this can 
decide nothing regarding those expectations of reason which lead it to hope for 
better success in its future attempts, and to build claims on this foundation; 
and consequently no more censorship can put an end to the dispute regarding 
the rights of reason.24  
 
What is needed, therefore,  
 
«LV QRW WKH FHQVRUVKLS EXW WKH criticism of reason, whereby not its present 
bounds but its determinate [and necessary] limits, not its ignorance on this or 
that point but its ignorance in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind, 
are demonstrated from principles, and not merely arrived at by way of 
conjecture. Scepticism is thus a resting-place for human reason, where it can 
reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and make survey of the region in which 
it finds itself, so that for the future it may be able to choose its path with more 
certainty. But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement. Such can be 
obtained only through perfect certainty in our knowledge, alike of the objects 
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themselves and of the limits within which all our knowledge of objects is 
enclosed.25 
 
8OWLPDWHO\ WKHUHIRUH .DQW¶V UHVSRQVH WR D VFHSWLF OLNH +XPH LV WR DUJXH WKDW WKH\
must let themselves to be co-RSWHG LQWR .DQW¶V FULWLFDO SURJUDPPH IRU SKLORVRSK\
which will allow a genuine peace for metaphysics to be achieved. 
 
 
III 
 
, KDYH DUJXHG LQ WKLV SDSHU IRU D FHUWDLQ ZD\ RI FRQFHLYLQJ RI .DQW¶V UHVSRQVH WR
+XPH , KDYH VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKLV JLYHV XV D PRUH URXQGHG YLHZ RI .DQW¶V DQWL-
sceptical concerns, which should not be compartmentalized in the way suggested by 
commentators such as Guyer. 
 ,QKLVSDSHU*X\HUUHPDUNVWKDW.DQWµRYHUVWDWHV¶WKHZD\LQZKLFK+XPHDQ
scepticism shaped the Critique by saying (in the Critique of Practial Reason)26 that it 
had an influence on the book as a whole µUHIXWLQJ +XPHDQ VFHSWLFLVP DERXW WKH
universality and necessity of first principles is the project of only the first half of the 
Critique, while the second half is devoted to the resolution of Pyrrhonian scepticism 
about the metaphysical claims of pure UHDVRQ¶27 If I am right about how these two 
LVVXHV ILW WRJHWKHU KRZHYHU LWZRXOG WXUQRXW WKDW.DQW¶V FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ LV QRW DQ
H[DJJHUDWLRQDWDOOEXWUDWKHUDSURSHUHVWLPDWHRIWKHZD\LQZKLFK.DQW¶VUHVSRQVH
WR +XPH¶V VFHSWLFLVP PDGH WKHLU PDUN RQ .DQW¶V WUHDWPHQW RI WKH SUREOHPV RI
metaphysics, along with so much else. 
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